

*General Carroll*

1. LOGISTICS REQUIREMENTS FOR THE VIET CONG/NORTH VIETNAM ARMY

THIS PRESENTATION ON VIET CONG/NORTH VIETNAM ARMY LOGISTICS WILL UPDATE THE CURRENT AND PROJECTED EXTERNAL RESUPPLY REQUIREMENTS NECESSARY TO SUSTAIN OPERATIONS OF THE REGULAR COMMUNIST FORCES IN SOUTH VIETNAM. THIS HAS BEEN NECESSITATED BY THREE ELEMENTS (1) INCREASED COMMUNIST TROOP STRENGTH, (2) INCREASED LEVEL OF COMBAT AND (3) IMPROVED INTELLIGENCE.

THE INITIAL DIA STUDY ON VIET CONG/NORTH VIETNAM ARMY EXTERNAL LOGISTICS RESUPPLY REQUIREMENTS WAS COMPLETED ON 3 MAY 1965. A DIA BRIEFING TEAM TOGETHER WITH AN ACSI REPRESENTATIVE, WAS SENT TO CINCPAC, USARPAC, AND MACV TO OBTAIN THE REACTIONS FROM THE FIELD ON THE METHODOLOGY, RATIONALE AND VALIDITY OF THE STUDY. THESE COMMANDS GENERALLY AGREED WITH THE DIA POSITION. MACV SUGGESTED THAT THE CLASS I SUPPLY FOR PORTERS AND INFILTRATORS BE INCLUDED IN THE TOTAL REQUIREMENT. THIS WAS DONE.

TO APPRECIATE THE METHODOLOGY USED IN THE COMPUTATIONS, IT IS NECESSARY TO BEAR IN MIND FIVE BASIC ELEMENTS:

FIRST - STRENGTH OF FORCES. THIS IS BASED ON MACV ORDER OF BATTLE HOLDINGS OF COMBAT AND COMBAT SUPPORT ELEMENTS. THE STRENGTH IS THEN REDUCED TO BATTALION EQUIVALENTS IN ORDER TO ARRIVE AT A "BATTALION SLICE" OF THE TOTAL SUPPLY REQUIREMENT.

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AND A POUNDS PER MAN/PER DAY REQUIREMENT AS OUTLINED IN FM 101-10.

AN IMPORTANT POINT HERE IS THE MARKED INCREASE IN VC/NVA REGULAR FORCES SINCE MAY OF 1965. AT THAT TIME COMMUNIST STRENGTH WAS ESTIMATED AT ONLY 65,000 MEN.

SECOND - THE LEVELS OF COMBAT. THE CURRENT LEVEL IS DEDUCED BY RESEARCHING MACV REPORTS ON TYPE AND SIZE OF ENEMY UNITS CONFRONTED BY FRIENDLY FORCES. THIS PRESENT LEVEL SHOWS A MARKED INCREASE.

THIRD AND FOURTH - THE BASIC LOAD OF WEAPONS AND AMMUNITION. THESE STATISTICS ARE TAKEN FROM A MACV RELATIVE FIREPOWER STUDY AND NORTH VIETNAM ARMY TABLE OF EQUIPMENT.

FIFTH - THE ESTIMATED PROCUREMENT AND EXPENDITURE OF VARIOUS CLASSES OF SUPPLY - THIS DERIVED FROM AVAILABLE DATA HERE AND IN THE FIELD, AND LEADS TO THE CONCLUSION THAT THE VC/NVA ARE ABLE TO PROCURE MOST OF THEIR SUPPLY REQUIREMENTS, THROUGH THEIR SYSTEM OF TAXATION, LOCAL PROCUREMENT, EXTORTION, AND PRODUCTION OF FOOD BY ORGANIZED UNITS.

IN DETERMINING THE AMOUNT OF AMMUNITION EXPENDED IN A BATTALION SIZE ENGAGEMENT, EXPERIENCE DATA CONTAINED IN FM 101-10 WERE USED AS A GUIDE AND VERIFIER FOR ESTIMATING THE BASIC LOAD EXPENDITURE IN EACH ENGAGEMENT. USING 7.9 TONS

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A STANDARD MEASURE FOR AMMUNITION BASIC LOADS FOR VC/NVA BATTALIONS, IT HAS BEEN ESTIMATED THAT EACH DAY A UNIT IS IN ACTION IT EXPENDS ABOUT 1/3 OF ITS BASIC LOAD OF AMMUNITION. THE COMBAT FACTOR USED IS THAT OF AN ATTACK OF A FORTIFIED POSITION.

A COMPARISON OF VC/NVA STRENGTHS ARE SHOWN ON THIS SLIDE. WE AGREE WITH THE MACV ESTIMATE, THAT A TOTAL FORCE OF 155 COMBAT BATTALIONS COULD BE ACHIEVED BY THE END OF 1966.

IN THIS NEXT SLIDE, WE HAVE ESTIMATED THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THREE LEVELS OF COMBAT:

THE CURRENT LEVEL OF COMBAT IS ONE IN WHICH THE VC/NVA FORCE IS ENGAGED IN COMBAT 1 DAY OUT OF 30 DAYS AND THE LOGISTIC RESUPPLY REQUIREMENTS FROM OUTSIDE SOUTH VIETNAM ARE ESTIMATED TO BE <sup>28</sup>28 SHORT TONS PER DAY.

THE RESUPPLY REQUIREMENTS WHEN THE ENTIRE FORCE IS ENGAGED IN COMBAT 1 DAY OUT OF EVERY 15 DAYS IS ESTIMATED TO BE <sup>54</sup>54 SHORT TONS PER DAY.

THE RESUPPLY REQUIREMENTS WHEN THE VC/NVA FORCE IS ENGAGED IN COMBAT 1 DAY OUT OF EVERY 7 IS ESTIMATED TO BE 101 SHORT TONS PER DAY. MACV ESTIMATES THAT THIS LEVEL OF COMBAT WILL BE REACHED BEFORE THE END OF 1966.

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A COMPARISON BETWEEN CURRENT AND PROJECTED EXTERNAL RESUPPLY REQUIREMENTS ARE SHOWN ON THIS SLIDE.

ALTHOUGH WE HAVE PROJECTED A NEED FOR 138 TONS AT HIGHEST LEVEL OF COMBAT AND PROJECTED STRENGTH, THIS FIGURE COULD BE MUCH LARGER BASED ON MANY INTANGIBLES. FOR EXAMPLE, THE LOSS OF STOCKAGE, THE IMPACT OF AIR STRIKES AND AIR INTERDICTION, INCREASED FORCED MOVEMENT OF THE ENEMY.

WE WOULD LIKE TO EMPHASIZE THAT SUFFICIENT INFORMATION TO MAKE A DEFINITIVE ASSESSMENT IS LACKING. THE ESTIMATE OF THE CURRENT LEVEL OF COMBAT IS ESPECIALLY TENUOUS AND WOULD VARY AS MUCH AS 20-30 PERCENT. THEREFORE AVAILABLE INFORMATION IS TEMPERED WITH MILITARY JUDGMENT TO PRODUCE THE BEST ESTIMATE POSSIBLE UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCE.

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